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Introduction
A defining characteristic of the U.S. labor market is its
fluid nature. Half of all new jobs (worker/employer
matches) end in the first year and, at any point in time,
about 20 percent of workers have been with their cur-
rent employer for less than one year (Farber, 1999a).1
This fluidity allows rapid reallocation of workers across
sectors in response to demand shifts, and the relatively
small direct costs to employers of laying off workers en-
courages hiring in the face of uncertain future demand.
Rates of employment growth in the U.S. have dwarfed
those in Western Europe in no small measure because
of the relatively small costs to firms of shedding work-
ers in the U.S. compared with their counterparts in the
European Union. However, this flexibility can impose
substantial costs on the workers who lose jobs.
My goal here is to characterize the level of job loss
and the costs to job losers over the 1981–2003 period
and to look for changes over time, both cyclical and
secular, in the types of workers who lose jobs and the
costs borne by various types of job losers.
Perhaps the most comprehensive source of informa-
tion on the incidence and costs of job loss in the United
States is the Displaced Workers Survey (DWS), adminis-
tered every two years since 1984 as a supplement to the
Current Population Survey (CPS). In this article, I incor-
porate the data from the latest (January 2004) DWS,
covering the period through 2003.2 The tight labor mar-
ket of the 1990s saw a dramatic reduction in the civil-
ian unemployment rate from an average of 7.3 percent in
the 1980s to a low of 4.0 percent in 2000. The annual aver-
age unemployment rate rose steadily through the 2001
recession and beyond, reaching 6.0 percent in 2003. Job
loss and worker displacement are of particular concern
in this period, given the perceived continuing general
weakness in the labor market, fears of worker displace-
ment due to import competition and outsourcing of
jobs, and the substantial costs borne by job losers.
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There are three important issues of measurement
and interpretation that arise when one compares job
loss rates calculated using the DWS over time. First,
the DWS asks only about a single involuntary job loss.
The survey does not capture multiple job losses by
the same worker. Neither does it capture worker ter-
minations “for cause.” The survey is meant to capture
worker terminations as the result of business decisions
of the employer unrelated to the performance of the
particular employee (for example, a plant closing, a
layoff, the abolition of a job). Thus, the measure of
the job loss rate that I calculate is the fraction of workers
who lost at least one job not “for cause” in the relevant
period rather than the rate of destruction of worker–
employer matches.
From 1984 to 1992, the DWS asked about job
separations in the previous five years, while the later
DWS asked about job separation in the previous three
years. The measure of job loss that I use is adjusted
to account for this change in the recall period so that
all rates are reported on a three-year basis. This ad-
justment is detailed in Farber (1997).
The basic wording of key questions has changed
since the inception of the DWS in 1984. This may have
affected whether survey respondents would report a
job separation in a particular circumstance as an in-
voluntary separation in one survey but would not re-
port a separation in the same circumstance as involuntary
in another year. In Farber (1998) and Farber (2004),
I use additional data from debriefing questions asked
of a fraction of DWS respondents in 1996, 1998, and
2000 to investigate how changes in the wording of the14 2Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
key question may have affected the likelihood that a
worker reported a particular separation as an involuntary
job change. I use the results of that analysis to calcu-
late re-weighted job loss rates that I present in this study.
Based on the three-year rates of job loss that I com-
puted, adjusting for the change in the recall period and
for changes in the wording of the key job loss question,
I find that the rate of job loss has followed a roughly
cyclical pattern between 1981 and 2004. However, the
overall rate of job loss increased through the 1993–95
period, despite the sustained economic expansion, and
through the 2001–04 period, despite the onset of the
expansion in late 2001.
I investigate the consequences of job loss along
several dimensions. These include post-displacement
probability of employment, the probability of part-time
employment, and the magnitude of the earnings loss
suffered by job losers. I break the earnings loss into
two components: 1) the difference between the earn-
ings received by job losers on their post-displacement
job and the earnings they received prior to displace-
ment; and 2) foregone earnings growth measured by
the earnings growth received by a group of non-dis-
placed workers. I find that more educated job losers
have higher post-displacement employment rates and
are more likely to be employed full-time. Those who
are reemployed, even full-time and regardless of edu-
cation level, suffer significant earnings declines rela-
tive to what they earned before they were displaced.
In addition to the decline in earnings, foregone earn-
ings growth is an important additional part of the
cost of job loss. One striking finding is that, for re-
employed job losers with education beyond high
school, the earnings loss is dramatically
larger in the 2001–2003 period than in
any earlier period for which there are data.
The rate of job loss
I analyze data on 839,434 individuals
between the ages of 20 and 64 from the
DWS conducted as part of the January
CPS in 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992,
2002, and 2004 and the February CPS in
1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000. In these sur-
veys, I count as job losers workers who
reported a job loss in the three calendar
years prior to the survey. Based on these
data, I calculate the rate of job loss as the
ratio of the number of reported job losers
divided by the number of workers who
were either employed at the survey date
or reported a job loss but were not
employed at the survey date. I then adjust
these job loss rates as described in Farber (2004) to
account for the change in the recall period from five
years to three years in 1994 and changes in the word-
ing of the key job loss question.3
In my view, information on rates of job loss is pre-
sented most accessibly in graphical form, and I orga-
nize the discussion here around a series of figures.4
Figure 1 contains plots of adjusted three-year job
loss rates computed from each DWS from 1984 to
2004, along with the average civilian unemployment
rate for each three-year period. The cyclical behavior
of job loss is apparent, with job-loss rates clearly posi-
tively correlated with the unemployment rate (ρ = 0.39).
Both unemployment and job-loss rates were high in
the 1981–83 period and they both fell sharply during
the expansion of the mid-1980s. However, the job-loss
rate rose much more sharply from the 1987–89 to the
1989–91 period than did the unemployment rate. The
job-loss rate rose by fully 3.1 percentage points (from
7.1 percent to 10.2 percent), while the average unem-
ployment rate rose by only 0.2 percent (from 5.7 per-
cent to 5.9 percent) over this period. Between 1993
and 1999, both the job-loss and unemployment rates
fell sharply, but the gap between them remained larg-
er than in the strong labor market of the late 1980s.
The unemployment rate continued to fall in the
1999–2001 period before rising somewhat in the
2001–03 period. The job loss rate rose sharply after
the 1997–99 trough through the 2001–03 period.5 The
gap between the job loss rate and the unemployment
rate is the largest it has been over the history of the DWS.
Figure 2 contains three-year rates of job loss by year
for each of four education categories. Not surprisingly,
job loss rates are dramatically higher for less educated
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FIGURE 3
Three-year job loss rate by age, 1981–2003
































workers than for more educated workers. There is a
strong cyclical pattern in job loss rates for less edu-
cated workers, but the cyclical pattern is weaker for
more educated workers. For example, the job loss
rate for workers with 12 years of education was 8.9
percent in 1997–99 (the lowest in the sample period),
compared with 14.3 percent in 1981–83. In contrast,
the job loss rate for workers with at least 16 years of
education was 6.7 percent in 1997–99, compared with
6.9 percent in 1981–83 and 5.4 percent
in 1987–89. It appears that there were
upsurges in job loss rates for more edu-
cated workers in the early and mid-1990s
and again early in the new century. The
job loss rate for workers with at least 16
years of education attained its highest
level in the 2001–03 period, 9.9 percent.
Job loss rates for the other educational
groups show a cyclical pattern but no
upward trend.
Figure 3 contains three-year job loss
rates by year for four age groups in a
range from 20 to 64. Job loss rates are
highest for the youngest workers (20–29)
and generally show the standard cyclical
pattern. The job loss rates of the two old-
est groups, ages 40–49 and 50–64, are
very similar. There is little evidence here
of a secular increase in job loss rates
among older workers.
Has there been a secular increase in the
rate of job loss?
It is clear that job loss was slow to
decline in the early stages of the econom-
ic expansion of the 1990s relative to the
decline in the economic expansion of the
1980s. Overall job-loss rates did decline
substantially beginning in the 1995–97
period and, by 1997–1999, were approxi-
mately as low as they had been in the late
1980s. There was some variation by educa-
tion and age. Job-loss rates among older
and more educated workers did decline
after 1995, but they remained higher than
they were at the peak of the 1980s expan-
sion. This may reflect the kind of restruc-
turing that has been the subject of much
attention since the early 1990s. Job loss
rates have increased substantially since
the 1999–2001 period and have not yet
declined. This is despite the fact that the
recession, as defined by the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research, ended in late 2001, and it
is likely due to the lack of robust employment
growth in the recovery to date.
The consequences of job loss
Due to the unusual character of the recession of
2001 and the subsequent recovery beginning in Novem-
ber 2001, it is of interest to investigate how workers
who lost jobs since 1991 have fared. The recession of
FIGURE 2
Three-year job loss rate by education, 1981–2003
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2001 followed a sustained expansion that
lasted for almost ten years and was of quite
short duration itself, lasting only eight
months or so.6 The expansion in 2002
and 2003 featured rapid gross domestic
product (GDP) and productivity growth
but relatively little employment growth
and only a small decline in the unemploy-
ment rate. Additionally, as I documented
above, job-loss rates remained high.
I examine two sets of outcomes for
displaced workers. The first set concerns
post job-loss employment experience,
and I examine survey-date labor force
status. These include rates of employ-
ment (both full- and part-time), unem-
ployment, and nonparticipation. The
second set of outcomes concerns earnings
among reemployed job losers. Here, I ex-
amine the change in weekly earnings for
displaced workers between the pre-dis-
placement job and the job held at the
DWS survey date. Because earnings of displaced
workers would likely have changed had the workers
not been displaced, I also use a control group of
workers from the outgoing rotation groups of the CPS
to compute the change in earnings over the same peri-
od covered by each DWS for workers who were not
displaced. I then use these changes to compute differ-
ence-in-difference (DID) estimates of the effect of
displacement on earnings of reemployed workers.
The design changes in the DWS since 1994 com-
plicate the analysis of the consequences of job loss.
Most importantly, the follow-up questions designed
to gather information on the characteristics of the lost
job and experience since job loss were asked only of
job losers who reported one of the following three
reasons for the job loss: slack work, plant closing, or
position/shift abolished. I term these the “big three”
reasons. Workers who lost jobs due to the ending of
FIGURE 4
Survey-date labor force status of job losers
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Survey-date labor force status of job losers, by sex
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FIGURE 6
Survey-date labor force status of job losers, by education
fraction fraction
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a temporary job, the ending of a self-employment sit-
uation, or “other” reasons were not asked the follow-
up questions. In order to maintain comparability across
years my analysis, regardless of year, uses only work-
ers who lost jobs for the big three reasons. Addition-
ally, in order to have a consistent sample over time,
I do not use information on job losers in the 1984–92
DWS whose reported job loss was more than three
years prior to the interview date.
Post-displacement labor force status
In this section, I examine how the distribution of
survey-date labor force status of workers has varied over
time and with other factors, including sex, education,
and age. Figure 4 contains plots of the fraction of job
losers employed, unemployed, and not in the labor
force at each DWS survey date. It is clear from this
figure that the post-displacement employment rate is
procyclical, with relatively low rates in the slack labor
markets of 1984 and 1992. The figure also shows that
the post-displacement employment rate has been in-
creasing since 1992, reaching its highest levels in 1998
before declining slightly in 2000 and then more sharp-
ly in 2002. The fraction employed increased slightly
at the most recent (2004) survey date.
Not surprisingly, the survey-date unemployment
rate among job losers moves counter-cyclically, with
peak unemployment rates at the 1984, 1992, and18 2Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
2002 survey dates. This mirrors the movements noted
in the employment fraction. The survey-date fraction
of job losers not in the labor force is remarkably con-
stant across all years, at about 10 percent. There is no
evidence that job losers are disproportionately dis-
couraged in recessions, leading to withdrawal from
the labor force.
The use of aggregate fractions in figure 4 masks
some important differences in labor force status
across workers by sex, education, and age. Figure 5
contains plots of the distribution of survey-date labor
force status by sex, and, while the male and female
plots show the same cyclical patterns, it is clear that
female job losers have weaker attachment to the labor
force. Women have lower post-displacement employ-
ment and unemployment rates and substantially higher
fractions not in the labor force. It is worth noting that
these differences by sex are among both men and women
who were working and lost a job, so that this does
not simply reflect the fact that some women are con-
sistently out of the labor force. It may reflect the fact
that some women have a richer set of alternative ac-
tivities on which to spend time, such as bearing and
raising children. It may be that the timing of job loss
among females, with its exogenous loss of specific cap-
ital, affects the timing of fertility decisions.
Another important dimension along which there
are differences is education. Figure 6 contains plots
FIGURE 7
Survey-date labor force status of job losers, by age
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of survey-date employment probabilities for displaced
workers by year broken down by education. Not sur-
prisingly, the likelihood of post-displacement employ-
ment rises with education, while there is a negative
relationship between post-displacement unemployment
and education.
The usual cyclical pattern of both the employment
and unemployment fractions exists at all education
levels. However, until recently, there was substantial-
ly more cyclical variation among the less educated.
In the early 1990s, the fraction employed among col-
lege graduate job losers fell from a peak of about 82
percent in 1990 to a trough of 74 percent in 1992, a
decline of 8 percentage points. Over the same period,
the fraction employed among high school graduate job
losers fell from 68 percent to 57 percent, a decline of
11 percentage points. In the most recent recession, the
fraction employed among college graduate job losers
fell from a peak of about 85 percent in 1998 to a trough
of 68 percent in 2002, a decline of 17 percentage points.
Over the same period, the fraction employed among
high school graduate job losers fell from 74 percent to
57 percent, also a decline of 17 percentage points. Frac-
tions unemployed follow a similar pattern.
The likelihood of being out of the labor force post-
displacement falls with education, although the gap
by education level has narrowed slightly over time.
There are also strong differences in post-displace-
ment labor force status by age. Figure 7 contains plots
of survey-date employment probabilities for displaced
workers by year broken down by age. As with sex
and education, the usual cyclical pattern of both the
FIGURE 8
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employment and unemployment frac-
tions exists at all age levels. Not surpris-
ingly, prime-age job losers (25–54 years
of age) have the strongest attachment to
the labor force. They have the highest
fraction employed and the lowest fraction
out of the labor force. Interestingly, older
job losers (55–64 years of age) are sub-
stantially more likely than younger job
losers to be out of the labor force.
Since older job losers have, on aver-
age, more seniority on the lost job, it is
likely that they lose more specific capital
on average as a result of job loss then do
younger workers. The result is that the
gap between earnings on the lost job and
likely reemployment earnings of older dis-
placed workers will be relatively large.
In this situation, it would not be surprising
that a substantial fraction of older dis-
placed workers would decide to retire
and report that they are not in the labor force subse-
quent to job loss.
Post-displacement full-time/part-time status
Many reemployed job losers are employed part-
time subsequent to job loss. Some of these workers
lost part-time jobs but many had lost full-time jobs.
In addition to having lower weekly earnings, it is well
known that part-time workers have substantially low-
er hourly wage rates then do full-time workers. The
DWS collects information on part-time status (less than
35 hours per week) on the lost job, and it is straightfor-
ward to compute part-time status on post-displacement
jobs from the standard CPS hours information. The
analysis in this section focuses only on individuals
employed at the survey date, and all part-time rates
are computed based on this group of workers.
Figure 8 contains a plot of the fraction of reem-
ployed job losers who are employed part-time at each
survey date conditional on part-time status on the lost
job.7 Not surprisingly, workers who lose part-time
jobs are substantially more likely to be working in
part-time jobs at the survey date. Many of these workers
are part-time due to labor supply choices, and it is
reasonable to expect that these workers would contin-
ue to choose to work part-time. It is noteworthy, then,
that on the order of 50 percent of part-time job losers
are working full-time at the survey date.
In terms of the cost of job loss, a more interesting
group to study consists of those workers who lost full-
time jobs. About 10 percent of these workers are work-
ing part-time at the survey date. It appears that there20 2Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
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is a cyclical component to the ability of full-time job
losers to find full-time employment. The post-displace-
ment part-time rate among full-time job losers is higher
in the slack labor markets of the early 1980s and the
early 1990s. This part-time rate reached its lowest level
in the late 1990s before increasing in 2002 and 2004.
There are important differences by sex in the post-
displacement part-time employment rate. In order to
illustrate these differences, figure 9 contains separate
plots for males and females of the fraction of reem-
ployed job losers that were employed part-time at each
survey date conditional on part-time status on the lost
job. The post-displacement part-time rate is substan-
tially higher (about 10 percentage points) among fe-
males, even controlling for part-time status on the lost
job. This is consistent with the earlier finding that,
relative to male job losers, female job losers are less
likely to be reemployed and more likely to be out of
the labor force. As noted earlier, this may be a labor
supply response, reflecting the fact that some women
have a richer set of alternative activities.
The loss in earnings due to displacement
The analysis of the loss in earnings of reemployed
displaced workers proceeds in two stages. First, I in-
vestigate the change in earnings between the lost job
and the job held at the DWS survey date. However,
had the displaced worker not lost his or her job, earn-
ings likely would have grown over the interval be-
tween the date of job loss and the DWS survey date.
Thus, second, I investigate the earnings loss suffered
by displaced workers including both the decline in
earnings of the displaced workers and the increase in
earnings enjoyed by non-displaced workers that is fore-
gone by displaced workers. In order to measure this
earnings loss, I need a control group of non-displaced
workers, and later, I provide such a control group us-
ing data from the CPS outgoing rotation groups.
Difference estimates of the change in earnings
as a result of job loss
I begin the analysis of earnings changes by ex-
amining the difference in real weekly earnings between
the post-displacement job and the job from which the
worker was displaced.8 I restrict my analysis of week-
ly earnings changes to workers who make full-time to
full-time employment transitions (that is, lost a full-
time job and are reemployed in a full-time job).9
Figure 10 contains the average decline in log real
weekly earnings between the lost job and the survey-
date job for workers who were not self-employed on
either the lost job or the new job and who made full-
time to full-time transitions broken down by survey
year. It is clear that there is a strong cyclical compo-
nent to the earnings change. The average earnings
decline was quite large in 1981–83 (10.8 percent)
and eventually fell to 5.6 percent in 1987–89 before
rising to 11.3 percent in 1989–91. During the 1990s
the decline in average real earnings decreased, falling
to a statistically insignificant 0.2 percent in the
1997–99 period. The magnitude of the decline in-
creased subsequently, rising to its highest level (13.6
percent) in the most recent period.
Figure 11 contains the average decline in log real
weekly earnings between the lost job and the survey-date21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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job for workers who make full-time to full-time tran-
sitions broken down by education. During the first
part of the sample period (1981–91), there were sta-
tistically significant differences in earnings changes
across educational categories, with workers with
more education suffering smaller earnings declines,
on average, than workers with less education. How-
ever, since 1991 the differences in earnings changes
across educational groups have not been statistically
significant. There was a general decline in the earn-
ings loss across educational categories during the
1990s that has reversed since the 1999–01 period.
One striking finding is that the average earnings de-
cline of job losers who have attended college is now
larger than the average earnings decline of workers
with less education.
 While not presented here, multivariate regression
analysis of the earnings change of displaced workers
shows no significant relationship with race or sex.10
However, there is a very strong relationship between
the change in earnings and tenure on the lost job. The
average earnings loss is dramatically larger when the
worker had accumulated substantial tenure on the
lost job. This is consistent with the destruction of
job-specific human capital when a long-term job ends.11
Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect
of job loss on earnings
In order to account for the extent to which earnings
might have grown had the workers not been displaced,
I generate a comparison group of work-
ers using a random sample from the
merged outgoing rotation group (MOGRG)
files of the CPS for the three calendar years
prior to each DWS (period 0), together
with all workers from the outgoing rotation
groups of the CPS containing the DWS
(period t). The data from MOGRG files
of the CPS provides the period 0 earn-
ings, and the data from the outgoing rota-
tion groups in the CPS containing the
DWS provide the period t earnings.
More formally, define the change in
log real earnings for displaced workers as
1) ∆d = (lnWdt – lnWd0),
and define the difference in log real earnings
for workers in the comparison group as
2) ∆c = (lnWct – lnWc0),
where d refers to displaced workers (the
“treatment” group), c refers to non-dis-
placed workers (the “comparison” group), t refers to
“current” (post-displacement) period, and 0 refers to the
“initial” (pre-displacement) period. The difference-in-
difference estimate of the loss in real weekly earn-
ings due to job loss is computed as
3) ∆∆ = ∆d – ∆c.
Assuming average earnings would have grown
rather than declined in the absence of displacement,
∆c will be positive, so that the difference-in-difference
estimate of the average earnings decline (∆∆) will be
larger in absolute value than the simple difference es-
timate (∆d).
I generate initial earnings for the comparison group
(lnWc0) from a random sample from the merged out-
going rotation group CPS file (MOGRG) each year
from 1981 to 2003.12 The resulting comparison sam-
ple of initial earnings for full-time workers contains
121,550 observations.
The CPS containing the DWS has two outgoing
rotation groups (OGRGs) with earnings data for all
workers. These provide the observations on current
earnings for the comparison group of non-displaced
workers (lnWct). This sample contains observations
on full-time earnings for 119,269 workers at the DWS
survey date.
Ideally, these comparison groups would contain
only workers who had not lost a job during the relevant22 2Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 11
Average decline in log weekly earnings, by year and education
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period. While I can identify the displaced workers in
period t (since the data come from the CPS with
DWS), I cannot identify the workers who will be dis-
placed in the MOGRG samples. To the extent that
earnings growth for displaced workers is different from
that for the non-displaced workers, earnings growth
computed from the comparison group as defined here
would lead to biased estimates of earnings growth
for a group of non-displaced workers. In order to ad-
dress this problem, I adjust the estimates based on
the outgoing rotation groups to provide unbiased es-
timates of the earnings change for a comparison group
of non-displaced workers. This adjustment is described
in the appendix.
The source of data for the treatment group’s earn-
ings is clear. These data come from the DWS, where
lnWdt is survey-date earnings for displaced workers
and lnWd0 is earnings on the lost job. The pre-displace-
ment sample consists of all displaced workers who
were not self-employed but were employed full-time
on the lost job and who were employed with earnings
available at the survey date (n = 21,264). The post-dis-
placement sample consists of all displaced workers
who were not self-employed but were employed full-time
at the survey date and who had earnings data available
on the lost job (n = 19,460).
These data are used as described in the appendix
to compute the regression-adjusted difference-in-dif-
ference estimates of the earnings loss from job loss
for full-time workers for each year.
Figure 12 contains the overall difference-in-dif-
ference estimates of the earnings loss from job loss for
each year.13 In order for the figure to be clearly readable,
the earnings loss for displaced workers in presented23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 12




































as a positive number (the negative of the earnings
change for displaced workers: –∆d). The foregone
earnings increase is ∆c, and the difference-in-differ-
ence earnings effect is ∆∆. Note that these estimates in-
corporate the effect of normal growth along the age–
earnings profile. This is because the age variables in
the regression are measured at the DWS survey date
(period t) for both the period 0 and period t observa-
tions.14 The results show that in the 1980s displaced
workers earned about 9 percent less, on average, af-
ter displacement than before, while earnings for the
comparison group rose by about 4.5 percent over the
same period. The difference-in-difference estimate of
the earnings loss is the difference between these num-
bers, which is a loss of about 13 percent during the
1980s.15 The 1990s show a more striking pattern. The
earnings decline of displaced workers in the 1990s
dropped sharply during the decade, from 11.3 percent
in the 1989–91 period to a statistically insignificant
0.9 percent in 1997–99. During the same period, the
earnings growth of the comparison group increased
from 2.9 percent in 1989–91 to 7.5 percent in 1997–
99, reflecting the general increase in real wages in
the late 1990s. The difference-in-difference estimate
of the earnings loss associated with job loss decreased
during the 1990s (from a high of 13.8 percent in 1989–
91 to a low of 6.7 percent in 1995–97), reflecting the
fact that the earnings decline suffered by displaced
workers fell by more than earnings grew among the
comparison group.
The picture changes dramatically beginning with
the most recent recession. While the foregone earnings
increase fell somewhat from 7.5 percent in 1997–99
to 4.2 percent in 2001–03, the earnings decline suf-
fered by displaced workers increased substantially
from virtually zero in the 1997–99 period to 13.7
percent in 2001–03. The result is that the difference-
in-difference estimate of the earnings loss from dis-
placement increased from 7.8 percent in 1997–99 to
17.1 percent in 2001–03.
Figure 13 contains difference-in-difference esti-
mates of the earnings loss by education category.16
The year-by-year estimates by education level show
some interesting changes over time. Not surprisingly
given the work on increased inequality and the decline
in earnings among the less-skilled, job losers with less
than a high-school education suffered dramatic earnings
losses in the 1980s. This improved in the early 1990s,
but the difference-in-difference estimate of the earnings
loss for these workers has been increasing since the
mid-1990s. The estimated earnings losses are relatively
stable (in the 10 percent to 15 percent range) over time
for high-school graduates, although the composition
has shifted from predominantly an earnings decline to
more weight on foregone earnings growth.
The situation among job losers with more than a
high-school education is particularly striking since
the late 1990s. The difference-in-difference estimate
of the earnings loss associated with job loss for workers
with 13–15 years of education increased dramatically
to about 20 percent in the 2001–03 period,
more than tripling from about 6 percent
in 1997–99. For these workers, the cause
is a sharp increase in the earnings decline
associated with job loss from zero in
1997–99 to 16.5 percent in 2001–03. The
pattern is even starker for workers with at
least 16 years of education. The difference-
in-difference estimate of the earnings loss
for these workers increased to 21 percent in
the 2001–03 period, more than quadrupling
from about 4.5 percent in 1995–97. For
these workers, the cause is also a sharp in-
crease in the earnings decline associated
with job loss from less than zero (–2.5 per-
cent) in 1995–97 to 16.1 percent in 2001–
03. It is worth noting that, unlike in earlier
periods, the earning decline suffered by
workers with more than a high-school edu-
cation dwarfs that suffered by workers
with a high-school education or less.
It is also worth noting that foregone
earnings growth (the earnings change of24 2Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 13
Difference-in-difference analysis of proportional earnings loss, by education
fraction fraction
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the comparison group) has become a more important
component of the overall earnings effect of job loss
since the 1990s. This was particularly true for workers
with at least 16 years of education since 1995, but it
is a factor in all education groups in the 1995–99 pe-
riod. Job losers with at least 16 years of education in
the 1997–99 period suffered a dramatic real earnings
decline on average, while the college-educated com-
parison group saw a sharp rise in real earnings. This
pattern reversed somewhat in the 2001–03 period, with
foregone earnings growth becoming less important
relative to the earnings decline among those displaced.
Conclusion
Job loss and worker dislocation are facts of life
in the U.S. economy. They are part of an efficient
labor allocation process. The problem is in the costs
that are borne by job losers. While these costs are
cyclical, they are substantial even in good times. In
the most recent period (2001–03),
 About 35 percent of job losers are not employed
at the subsequent survey date;
 About 13 percent reemployed full-time job
losers are holding part-time jobs;25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
 Full-time job losers who find new full-time jobs
earn about 13 percent less on average in their
new jobs than in the lost job; and
 Counting foregone earnings increases enjoyed
by non-losers, full-time job losers who find new
full-time jobs earn up to 17 percent less on
average in their new jobs than they would have
had they not been displaced.
These measures likely substantially understate the
true economic cost of job loss. First, time spent unem-
ployed by those workers who are reemployed is not
considered. Second, more hinges on employment,
particularly full-time employment, in the U.S. than in
other developed countries. Health insurance and pen-
sions are closely linked to employment, and many
workers do not have alternative access to these im-
portant benefits. This makes job loss an expensive
and damaging event on average.
There is an underlying tension here between equi-
ty and efficiency. Most economists argue that the rel-
atively low costs of shedding workers in the U.S. are
efficiency enhancing, resulting in higher total output.
However, these costs are shared inequitably. Workers
generally bear too large a share of the burden, partic-
ularly when measured relative to their resources. These
costs, to the extent they reflect non-employment or
under-employment, also represent inefficiency. An
economy with too many unemployed workers is op-
erating inside its production possibilities frontier, and
resources are being wasted.
One appropriate policy response is to speed the
reallocation of workers to appropriate alternative em-
ployment. Perhaps modern information technology,
including internet job listings, job search, and so on,
would be useful. A second appropriate policy response
is helping workers acquire new skills suitable to a
changing economy. Another, more controversial, pol-
icy response would be relocation aid to encourage
displaced workers to relocate geographically to alle-
viate any geographic mismatch of workers and jobs.
While this may make sense in purely economic terms,
such mobility away from hard-hit areas imposes seri-
ous social costs. However, living in chronically de-
pressed communities also imposes such costs. A program
of universal health care that is not linked to employ-
ment would also mitigate some of the costs of job loss.
To conclude, job loss is both a strength and a
weakness of our economy. The core problem is how
to manage job loss to minimize the costs borne by
displaced workers and their communities. Programs
to aid matching of firms and workers, education and
retraining of job losers, relocation aid, and alternative
sources of health care and other job-related benefits
can all play a role.26 2Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
NOTES
1Tabulation of the mobility supplement to the January 2004
Current Population Survey yields the result that 19.5 percent of
workers have been with their employer for less than one year and
22.9 percent of workers have been with their employer for one
year or less.
2Examples of earlier work using the DWS include Farber (1993,
1997, 1998, 1999b, 2004), Podgursky and Swaim (1987), Kletzer
(1989), Topel (1990), Gardner (1995), Neal (1995), Esposito and
Fisher (1997), and Hipple (1999). I present a brief review of this
literature in Farber (2004).
3Job losers are asked to report the reason for their job loss. One
allowable response is “other.” The adjustment for changes in the
wording of the key job loss question discounts job loss rates for
“other” reasons by 37.4 percent for the 1984–92 DWS and by 74.8
percent for the 1994 and later DWS. See Farber (1998) for details.
4For the numerical values underlying all figures in this study, all
counts are weighted using the CPS sampling weights.
5The use of three-year averages here hides the facts that the job
loss rate was steady in 1999 and 2000 before increasing sharply
in 2001, while the unemployment rate declined slightly in 1999
and 2000 before increasing slightly in 2001. The comparison of
job loss rates for specific years of job loss compares the job loss
rates across surveys computed using only job losers who reported
losing jobs the same number of years prior to the survey date. For
example, the 2001 job loss rate is computed from the 2002 DWS
and compared with the 1999 job loss rate computed from the
2000 DWS. Similarly, the 2000 job loss rate is computed from
the 2002 DWS and compared with the 1998 job loss rate com-
puted from the 2000 DWS.
6The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau
of Economic Research dated the recession as starting March 2001
and ending in November 2001. See www.nber.org/cycles/
july2003.html.
7Note that there is a problem of temporal comparability of the
data on part-time employment at the survey date. The new survey
instrument, first used in the 1994 CPS, asks a different battery of
questions about hours of work on the current job, and this may
have the effect of raising the fraction of workers reporting they
are currently working part-time (Polivka and Miller, 1998). The
survey question regarding whether the lost job was part-time is
unchanged in the 1994 and later DWS.
8Earnings are deflated by the 1982–84 = 100 Consumer Price
Index (CPI).  The CPI in the reported year of displacement is
used to deflate earnings on the old job.  The CPI for the DWS
survey month is used to deflate current earnings.
9The change in real weekly earnings for workers who make a
full-time to full-time transition is a straightforward measure, but
it only gets at part of the effect of displacement on earnings. It
does not account for the effect of job loss on unemployment
spells, employment probabilities, or probabilities of part-time
work. Nor does it account for earnings growth that may have
occurred absent the job loss.
10See Farber (2004) for presentation of regression results on the
earnings change through the 2002 DWS.
11Kletzer (1989), Neal (1995), and Parent (1995) address the issue
of job loss and specific capital, both at the firm and industry level.
12The size of the random sample was set so that 1) the size of the
sample with initial earnings on the control group was expected to
be the same as that with current earnings on the control group
(two rotation groups); and 2) the distribution of years since the
associated DWS survey date roughly mimicked the distribution
of years since displacement in the sample of displaced workers.
In other words, a separate control sample was drawn for each
DWS from the three MOGRGs for the years immediately prior
to the DWS that reflected the distribution of time since job loss.
Each MOGRG file has 24 rotation groups (two per month for
12 months). Denote the share of reported job loss one, two, and
three years prior to the survey date t as p1t, p2t, and p3t respectively.
In order to get the appropriate sample size in survey year t, I took
a random sample with probability (p1t)(2)/24. Similarly, for the
second and third years prior to the DWS, I took random samples
with probability (p2t)(2)/24 and (p3t)(2)/24, respectively.
13These differences in log earnings are approximations to the appro-
priate proportional differences in earnings levels that are reason-
ably accurate for values of |∆| < 0.2.  Since some estimated values
are outside this range, I convert each of the estimates to the appro-
priate proportional difference as exp(∆) – 1 and proceed using
these transformed measures.
14This is one reason why it was important that the sample fractions
in the initial-earnings control group mimic the fractions in the treat-
ment group with respect to the time until the DWS survey date.
15Because I present the earnings loss rather than the earnings change
for displaced workers in the figure, the difference-in-difference
estimate is the negative of the sum of the earnings decline for dis-
placed workers and the foregone earnings increase.
16These estimates are based on separate regressions by educational
category for each year.27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The observed wage change of workers in the outgoing
rotation groups (which include both displaced and non-
displaced workers) is a probability-of-job-loss weight-
ed average of the change in earnings for displaced and
non-displaced workers. Define the change in earnings
for the outgoing rotation groups as
4) ∆c = (1 – θ)∆c + θ∆d,
where ∆c is the earnings change in the outgoing rotation
group sample (lnWct – lnWc0) and θ is the fraction of
workers in the outgoing rotation group sample who lost
a job (the displacement rate).
The observable quantities are ∆c and ∆d,  but
calculation of the difference-in-difference estimate
of the earnings change due to job loss requires both ∆d
and ∆c (equations 1 and 2).1 I can compute ∆c with the
available data on ∆c, ∆d, and θ. Using equation 4, the








and the difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of






Intuitively, the samples from the outgoing rotation
groups are “contaminated” with displaced workers
so that the difference-in-difference estimate computed
using this contaminated control group needs to be
scaled up by the factor 
1
(1 ) −θ   to compensate.
The difference-in-difference estimates are derived
from separate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for
each DWS survey year of log real earnings (deflated by
the CPI) on a set of worker characteristics and an indica-
tor for time period (before or after displacement), an indi-
cator for whether the observation is part of the
“contaminated” control sample or part of the displace-
ment sample, and the interaction of the time period and
sample indicators.2 This regression is
7) lnWis = Xisβ + γ1Ts + γ2Di + γ3TsDi + εis,
where lnWis measures log real full-time earnings for in-
dividual i in period s (either 0 or t), X is a vector of in-
dividual characteristics, β is a vector of coefficients, Ts is
a dummy variable indicating the post-displacement pe-
riod, Di is a dummy variable indicating the displace-
ment sample, and ε is an error term.3 The parameters γj
are used along with information from the DWS on job
loss rates (θ) to compute estimates of the earnings ef-
fects as follows:
8) ∆d = γ1 + γ3,
3











APPENDIX: DETAILS OF THE DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE PROCEDURE
1Note that I do not use the information on who is displaced that is available in the DWS outgoing rotation groups. My estimate of ∆c
includes both displaced and non-displaced workers at both time 0 and time t.
2Note that I do not calculate first-differenced estimates for the displaced workers, as I did in the previous section, despite the fact that
the observations are paired. This is because observations for the control group are from a set of cross-sections and are not paired. I do
not account for the correlation over time in the two observations for each displaced worker.
3The X vector includes a constant and dummy variables for sex, race, nine age categories, and four educational categories.28 2Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
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